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Experiments suggest that communication increases the contribution of public goods (Ledyard, 1995) and also that people trade off the benefit of
lying against the harm that they inflict on others (Gneezy, 2005).
We construct a two-player model of pre-play negotiation that assumes the latter and implies the former finding. We call a strategy profile
agree¬able if an agreement to play accordingly would not be broken and if both players have an incentive to reach such an agreement.
In a symmetric game with strategic substitutes, as the standard Cournot duopoly, the trading off of benefit and harm when lying implies that
players' incentives to respect an agreement decrease with its efficiency. Such conflicts may be absent in symmetric games with (weak) strategic
complements. In fact, in the linear public good game or the moral hazard in teams, an efficient agreement is agreeable if and only if any
non-equilibrium action profile is agreeable.
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